Unexpected arousal shapes confidence – blog and news coverage

For those looking for a good summary of our recent publication, several outlets gave us solid coverage for expert and non-expert alike. Here is a short summary of the most useful write-ups:

The eLife digest itself was excellent – make sure to fill out the survey at the end to let eLife know what you think of the digests  (I love them).

via Arousing confidence – Brains and Behaviour – Medium

As you read the words on this page, you might also notice a growing feeling of confidence that you understand their meaning. Every day we make decisions based on ambiguous information and in response to factors over which we have little or no control. Yet rather than being constantly paralysed by doubt, we generally feel reasonably confident about our choices. So where does this feeling of confidence come from?

Computational models of human decision-making assume that our confidence depends on the quality of the information available to us: the less ambiguous this information, the more confident we should feel. According to this idea, the information on which we base our decisions is also the information that determines how confident we are that those decisions are correct. However, recent experiments suggest that this is not the whole story. Instead, our internal states — specifically how our heart is beating and how alert we are — may influence our confidence in our decisions without affecting the decisions themselves.

To test this possibility, Micah Allen and co-workers asked volunteers to decide whether dots on a screen were moving to the left or to the right, and to indicate how confident they were in their choice. As the task became objectively more difficult, the volunteers became less confident about their decisions. However, increasing the volunteers’ alertness or “arousal” levels immediately before a trial countered this effect, showing that task difficulty is not the only factor that determines confidence. Measures of arousal — specifically heart rate and pupil dilation — were also related to how confident the volunteers felt on each trial. These results suggest that unconscious processes might exert a subtle influence on our conscious, reflective decisions, independently of the accuracy of the decisions themselves.

The next step will be to develop more refined mathematical models of perception and decision-making to quantify the exact impact of arousal and other bodily sensations on confidence. The results may also be relevant to understanding clinical disorders, such as anxiety and depression, where changes in arousal might lock sufferers into an unrealistically certain or uncertain world.

The PNAS journal club also published a useful summary, including some great quotes from Phil Corlett and Rebecca Todd:

via Journal Club: How your body feels influences your confidence levels | National Academy of Sciences

… Allen’s findings are “relevant to anyone whose job is to make difficult perceptual judgments trying to see signal in a lot of noise,” such as radiologists or baggage inspectors, says cognitive neuroscientist Rebecca Todd at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, who did not take part in the research. Todd suggests that people who apply decision-making models to real world problems need to better account for the influence of internal or emotional states on confidence.

The fact that bodily states can influence confidence may even shed light on mental disorders, which often involve blunted or heightened signals from the body. Symptoms could result from how changes in sensory input affect perceptual decision-making, says cognitive neuroscientist and schizophrenia researcher Phil Corlett at Yale University, who did not participate in this study.

Corlett notes that some of the same ion channels involved in regulating heart rate are implicated in schizophrenia as well. “Maybe boosting heart rate might lead people with schizophrenia to see or hear things that aren’t present,” he speculates, adding that future work could analyze how people with mental disorders perform on these tasks…

I also wrote a blog post summarizing the article for The Conversation:

via How subtle changes in our bodies affect conscious awareness and decision confidence

How do we become aware of our own thoughts and feelings? And what enables us to know when we’ve made a good or bad decision? Every day we are confronted with ambiguous situations. If we want to learn from our mistakes, it is important that we sometimes reflect on our decisions. Did I make the right choice when I leveraged my house mortgage against the market? Was that stop light green or red? Did I really hear a footstep in the attic, or was it just the wind?

When events are more uncertain, for example if our windscreen fogs up while driving, we are typically less confident in what we’ve seen or decided. This ability to consciously examine our own experiences, sometimes called introspection, is thought to depend on the brain appraising how reliable or “noisy” the information driving those experiences is. Some scientists and philosophers believe that this capacity for introspection is a necessary feature of consciousness itself, forging the crucial link between sensation and awareness.

One important theory is that the brain acts as a kind of statistician, weighting options by their reliability, to produce a feeling of confidence more or less in line with what we’ve actually seen, felt or done. And although this theory does a reasonably good job of explaining our confidence in a variety of settings, it neglects an important fact about our brains – they are situated within our bodies. Even now, as you read the words on this page, you might have some passing awareness of how your socks sit on your feet, how fast your heart is beating or if the room is the right temperature.

Even if you were not fully aware of these things, the body is always shaping how we experience ourselves and the world around us. That is to say experience is always from somewhere, embodied within a particular perspective. Indeed, recent research suggests that our conscious awareness of the world is very much dependent on exactly these kinds of internal bodily states. But what about confidence? Is it possible that when I reflect on what I’ve just seen or felt, my body is acting behind the scenes? …

The New Scientist took an interesting angle not as explored in the other write-ups, and also included a good response from Ariel Zylberberg:

via A bit of disgust can change how confident you feel | New Scientist

“We were tricking the brain and changing the body in a way that had nothing to do with the task,” Allen says. In doing so, they showed that a person’s sense of confidence relies on internal as well as external signals – and the balance can be shifted by increasing your alertness.

Allen thinks the reaction to disgust suppressed the “noise” created by the more varied movement of the dots during the more difficult versions of the task. “They’re taking their own confidence as a cue and ignoring the stimulus in the world.”

“It’s surprising that they show that confidence can be motivated by processes inside a person, instead of what we tend to believe, which is that confidence should be motivated by external things that affect a decision,” says Ariel Zylberberg at Columbia University in New York. “Disgust leads to aversion. If you try a food and it’s disgusting, you walk away from it,” says Zylberberg. “Here, if you induce disgust, high confidence becomes lower and low confidence becomes higher. It could be that disgust is generating this repulsion.”

It is not clear whether it is the feeling of disgust that changes a person’s confidence in this way, or whether inducing alertness with a different emotion, such as anger or fear, would have the same effect.

You can find all the coverage for our article using these excellent services, altmetric & ImpactStory.

https://www.altmetric.com/details/12986857

https://impactstory.org/u/0000-0001-9399-4179/p/mfatd6ZhpW

Thanks to everyone who shared, enjoyed, and interacted with our research!

The return of neuroconscience

Hello everyone! After an amazing visit back home to Tampa Florida for VSS and a little R&R in Denmark i’m back and feeling better than ever. Some of you may have noticed that i’ve been on an almost 6 month blogging hiatus. I’m just going to come right out and admit that after moving from Denmark to London, I really wasn’t sure what direction I wanted to take my blog. Changing institutions is always a bit of a bewildering experience, and a wise friend once advised me that it’s sometimes best to quietly observe new surroundings before diving right in. I think I needed some time to get used to being a part of the awesomeness that is the Queen Square neuroimaging hub. I also needed some time to reflect on the big picture of my research, this blog, and my overall social media presence.

But fear not! After the horrors of settling into London, I’m finally comfortable in my skin again with a new flat, a home office almost ready, and lots and lots of new ideas to share with you. I think part of my overall hesitancy was a kind of pondering just what I should be sharing. But I didn’t get this far by bottling up my research, so there isn’t much point in shuttering myself in now! I expect to be back to blogging in full form in the next week, as new projects here begin to get underway. But where is my research going?

The big picture will largely remain the same. I am interested as always in human consciousness, thought, self-awareness, and our capacity for growth along these dimensions. One thing I really love about my post-doc is that I’ve finally found a kind of thread weaving throughout my research all the way back to the days when I collected funny self-narratives in a broom closet at UCF. I think you could say I’m trying to connect the dots between how dynamic bodies shape and interact with our reflective minds, using the tools of perceptual decision making, predictive coding, and neuroimaging. Currently i’m developing a variety of novel experimental paradigms examining embodied self-awareness (i.e. our somatosensory, interoceptive, and affective sense of self), perceptual decision making and metacognition, and interrelations between these. You can expect to hear more about these topics soon.

Indeed, a principle reason I chose to join the FIL/ICN team was the unique emphasis and expertise here on predictive coding. My research has always been united by an interest in growth, plasticity, and change. During my PhD I came to see predictive coding/free energy schemes as a unifying framework under-which to unite our understanding of embodied and neural computation in terms of our ability to learn from new experiences.  As such I’m very happy to be in a place where not only can I be on the cutting edge of theoretical development, but also receive first-hand training in applying the latest computational modelling, connectivity, and multi-modal imaging techniques to my research questions. As always, given my obvious level of topical ADHD, you can be sure to expect coverage of a wide-range of cogneuro and cogsci topics.

So in general, you can expect posts covering these topics, my upcoming results, and general musings along these lines. As always i’m sure there will be plenty of methodsy nitpicking and philosophical navel gathering. In particular, my recent experience with a reviewer insisting that ’embodiment’ = interoception has me itching to fire off a theoretical barrage – but I guess I should wait to publish that paper before taking to the streets. In the near future I have planned a series of short posts covering some of the cool posters and general themes I observed at the Vision Sciences Society conference this fall.

Finally, for my colleagues working on mindfulness and meditation research, a brief note. As you can probably gather, I don’t intend to return to this domain of study in the near future. My personal opinion of that topic is that it has become incredibly overhyped and incestous- the best research simply isn’t rising to the top. I know that many of the leaders in that community are well aware of that problem and are working to correct it, but for me I knew it was time to part ways and return to more general research. I do believe that mindfulness has an important role to play in both self-awareness and well-being, and hope that the models I am currently developing might one day further refine our understanding of these practices. However, I guess it’s worth noting that for me, meditation was always more of a kind of Varellian way to manipulate plasticity and consciousness rather than an end in itself; as I no longer buy into the enactive/neurophenomenological paradigm, I guess it’s self explanatory that I would be moving on to other things (like actual consciousness studies! :P). I do hope to see that field continue to grow and mature, and look forward to fruitful collaborations along those lines.

 

That’s it folks! Prepare yourself for a new era of neuroconscience 🙂 Cheers to an all new year, all new research, and new directions! Viva la awareness!

 

 

Google Wave for Scholarly Co-authorship: excerpt from Neuroplasticity and Consciousness Abstract

Gary Williams and I are working together on a paper investigating the consciousness and neuroplasticity. We’re using Google wave for this collaboration, and I must say it is an excellent co-authorship tool. There is nothing quite so neat as watching your ideas flow and meld together in real time. There are now new built in document templates that make these kinds of projects a blast. As an added bonus, all edits are identified and tracked in real time, letting you keep easy track of who wrote what. One of the most suprising things to come out of this collaboration is the newness of the thoughts. Whatever it is we end up arguing, it is definetely not reducible to the sum of it’s parts. As a teaser, I thought I’d post a thread from the wave I made this morning. This is basically just me rambling on about consciousness and plasticity after reading the results of our wave. I wish I could post the movie of our edits, but that will have to wait for the paper’s submission.

I have an idea I want to work in that was provoked by this paper:
http://www.jneurosci.org/cgi/content/abstract/30/18/6205

Somewhere in here I still feel a nagging paradox, but I can’t seem to put my finger on it. Maybe I’m simply trying to explain something I don’t have an explanation for. I’m not sure. Consider this a list of thoughts that may or may not have any relationship to the kind of account we want to make here.

They basically show that different synthesthetic experiences have different neural correlates in the structural brain matter. I think it would be nice to tie our paper to the (likely) focus of the other papers; the idea of changing qualia / changing NCCs. Maybe we can argue that, due to neural plasticity, we should not expect ‘neural representations’ for sensory experience between any two adults to be identical; rather we should expect that every individual develops their own unique representational qualia that are partially ineffable. Then we can argue that it this is precisely why we must rely on narrative scaffolding to make sense of the world; it is only through practice with narrative, engendered by frontal plasticity, that we can understand the statistical similarities between our qualia and others. Something is not quite right in this account though… and our abstract is basically fine as is.

So, I have my own unique qualia that are constantly changing- my qualia and NCCs are in dynamical flux with one another. However, my embodiment pre-configures my sensory experience to have certain common qualities across the species. Narrative explanations of the world are grounded in capturing this intersubjectivity; they are linguistic representations of individual sense impressions woven together by cultural practices and schema. What we want to say is that, I am able to learn about the world through narrative practice precisely because I am able to map my own unique sensory representations onto others.

I guess that last part of what I said is still weak, but it seems like this could be a good element to explore in the abstract. It keeps us from being too far away from the angle of the call though, maybe. I can’t figure out exactly what I want to say. There are a few elements:

  • Narratives are co-created, coherent, shareable, complex representations of the world that encode temporality, meaning, and intersubjectivity.
  • I’m able to learn about these representations of the world through narrative practice; by mapping my own unique dynamic sensory experience to the sensory and folk psychological narratives of others.
  • Narrative encodes sensory experience in ways that transcend the limits of personal qualia; they are offloaded and are no longer dynamic in the same way.
  • Sensory experience is in constant flux and can be thrown out of alignment with narrative, as in the case of most psychopathy.
  • I need some way to structure this flux; narrative is intersubjective and it provides second order qualia??
  • Narrative must be plastic as it is always growing; the relations between events, experiences, and sensory representations must always be shifting. Today I may really enjoy the smell of flowers and all the things that come with them (memory of a past girlfriend, my enjoyment of things that smell sweet, the association I have with hunger). But tommorow I might get buried alive in some flowers; now my sensory representation for flowers is going to have all new associations. I may attend to a completely different set of salient factors; I might find that the smell now reminds me of a grave, that I remember my old girlfriend was a nasty bitch, and that I’m allergic to sweet things. This must be reflected in the connective weights of the sensory representations; the overall connectivity map has been altered because a node (the flower node) has been drastically altered by a contra-narrative sensory trauma.
  • I think this is a crucial account and it helps explain the role of the default mode in consciousness. On this account, the DMN is the mechanism driving reflective, spontaneous narrativization of the world. These oscillations are akin to the constant labeling and scanning of my sensory experience. That they in sleep probably indicates that this process is highly automatic and involved in memory formation. As introspective thoughts begin to gain coherency and collude together, they gain greater roles in my over all conscious self-narrative.
  • So I think this is what I want to say: our pre-frontal default mode is system is in constant flux. The nodes are all plastic, and so is the pattern of activations between them. This area is fundamentally concerned with reflective-self relatedness and probably develops through childhood interaction. Further, there is an important role of control here. I think that a primary function of social-constructive brain areas is in the control of action. Early societies developed complex narrative rule systems precisely to control and organize group action. This allowed us to transcend simple brute force and begin to coordinate action and to specialize in various agencies. The medial prefrontal cortex, the central node, fundementally invoked in acts of social cognition and narrative comprehension, has massive reciprocal connectivity to limbic areas, and also pre-frontal areas concerned with reward and economic decision making.
  • We need a plastic default mode precisely to allow for the kinds of radical enculturation we go through during development. It is quite difficult to teach an infant, born with the same basic equipment as a caveman, the intricacies of mathematics and philosophy. Clearly narrative comprehension requires a massive amount of learning; we must learn all of the complex cultural nuances that define us as modern humans.
  • Maybe sensory motor coupling and resonance allow for the simulation of precise spatiotemporal activity patterns. This intrinsic activity is like a constant ‘reading out’ of the dynamic sensory representations that are being constantly updated, through neuroplasticity; whatever the totality of the connection weights, that is my conscious narrative of my experience.
  • Back to the issue of control. It’s clear to me that the prefrontal default system is highly sensitive to intersubjective or social information/cues. I think there is really something here about offloading intentions, which are relatively weak constructions, into the group, where they can be collectively acted upon (like in the drug addict/rehab example). So maybe one role of my narration system is simply to vocalize my sensory experience (I’m craving drugs. I can’t stop craving drugs) so that others can collectively act on them.

Well there you have it. I have a feeling this is going to be a great paper. We’re going to try and flip the whole debate on it’s head and argue for a central role of plasticity in embodied and narrative consciousness. It’s great fun to be working with Gary again; his mastery of philosophy of mind and phenomenology are quite fearsome, and we’ve been developing these ideas forever. I’ll be sure to post updates from GWave as the project progresses.